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I , personally, don't have any
well thought-out views on Saddam's execution. I
gathered from what I had read about him that he was a
heartless tyrant. Some well-wishers of him argue that
a tyrant like him was needed to maintain sectarian
stability in Iraq. I do not believe so; but then what
was the alternative? Frankly, I do not know. Almost no
Muslim country has a peaceful system of transferring
power from one person (part) to another. His execution
reminded me of Zulfiqar Ali Bhutto's political murder.
Those who live by the sword, die
by the sword.
Having said that, I don't have
any other views on this issue. However, there is a
third view in addition to the two pervading the FOTH
board (those who regard Saddam a "lion-like" martyr
and those who regard him a "butcher"); this is the
unemotional political view of an American analyst. I
am quoting from Robert Dreyfus who wrote "Saddam's
Death squad Hanging," at Tompaine.commonsense on
January 3, 2007. Some extracts are presented herein:
"And then there is the official
death squad that hanged Saddam Hussein. They hanged
him unceremoniously, black-hooded killers chanting
Shiite religious slogans even as they placed the noose
around his neck, shouting “Muqtada! Muqtada! Muqtada!”
It was a sordid, even sleazy affair, replete with
boorish spectators shouting the names of supposed
Shiite clergy-martyrs. It followed a haphazard,
kangaroo-court trial, in which judges who couldn’t
stomach the travesty were fired and Saddam’s defense
lawyers murdered serially by death squads, in which
witnesses were paraded to denounce the accused without
any rebuttal or cross-examination, resembling the Red
Queen’s “Off with her head!” trial of Alice, with the
bulbous fictional monarch shouting: “Sentence first,
and verdict later!” And then, at the final moment, in
Baghdad , the dictator stood proud and erect, making
his killers look small and evil-minded. At once, the
dictator—who’d sent thousands to the gallows and to
the firing squad—became victim and martyr, and the
righteous sufferers were transformed into bloodthirsty
revenge-seekers.
Adding insult to injury, the
Iraqi authorities ordered the hurry-up execution at
the start of a major Muslim holiday (at least,
according to the Sunni religious calendar), on a
holiday whose theme is forgiveness. In so doing, the
Shiite-dominated regime made it clear that its own
religious calendar, not the Sunni version, is all that
matters in the New Iraq.
The Wall Street Journal
, in a profile of Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki on
Tuesday, quoted one of his aides saying that part of
Maliki’s motivation in speeding Saddam to the gallows
was that he feared a “secret deal sparing Mr.
Hussein’s life in exchange for a halt to attacks on
U.S. troops.” Although some reports, and some of my
sources, say that precisely that deal was considered
by more sensible administration officials—and why not?
why not give Saddam a life sentence as part of a
ceasefire agreement with the resistance?—it was never
a serious option. Indeed, since the very start of the
insurgency in late 2003, the United States has
repeatedly rejected the idea of peace talks with the
main force of the resistance, including Baath party
officials, former army and intelligence officers, the
clergy tied to the Association of Muslim Scholars and
resistance groups like the 1920 Revolution Brigade and
the Islamic Army of Iraq. Now, and so utterly
predictably, virtually the entire Sunni population of
Iraq is likely to line up foursquare behind the
insurgents, making it immeasurably more difficult to
ease sectarian and communal warfare.
Now, any chance that Saddam could
be used as a bargaining chip to help ease a deal with
the insurgents is gone, forever.
Amid such bungling, it’s
impossible to believe that any “surge” in U.S.
forces—or any other stay-the-course stratagem—will
make any difference in the end. With its sheer might
and with Bush’s bull-headed determination, the United
States can indeed kill many more Iraqis, perhaps even
hundreds of thousands more on top of the 655,000 dead
already. But in the end, either the United States will
withdraw from Iraq without the victory Bush
seeks—indeed, in defeat—or it will be expelled by
Iraqis themselves. By now, no Iraqi government will
have any credibility if it does not align itself with
Iraqi public opinion, which overwhelmingly (Sunni and
Shiite, alike) demands the withdrawal of U.S. troops."
Mohammad Gill
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